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LINEAR DECOMPOSITION ATTACK ON PUBLIC KEY
EXCHANGE PROTOCOLS USING SEMIDIRECT
PRODUCTS OF (SEMI)GROUPS
VITALI˘I ROMAN’KOV
Abstract. We show that a linear decomposition attack based on the
decomposition method introduced by the author in monography [1] and
paper [2] works by finding the exchanging keys in the both two main
protocols in [3] and [4].
1. Introduction
In this paper we present a new practical attack on two main protocols
proposed in [3] and [4]. This kind of attack introduced by the author in [1]
and [2] works when the platform groups are linear. We show that in this
case, contrary to the common opinion (and some explicitly stated security
assumptions), one does not need to solve the underlying algorithmic prob-
lems to break the scheme, i.e., there is another algorithm that recovers the
private keys without solving the principal algorithmic problem on which the
security assumptions are based. This changes completely our understand-
ing of security of these scheme. The efficacy of the attack depends on the
platform group, so it requires a specific analysis in each particular case. In
general one can only state that the attack is in polynomial time in the size of
the data, when the platform and related groups are given together with their
linear representations. In many other cases we can effectively use known lin-
ear presentations of the groups under consideration. A theoretical base for
the decomposition method is described in [5] where a series of examples is
presented. The monography [1] solves uniformly protocols based on the con-
jugacy search problem (Ko, Lee et. al. [6], Wang, Cao et. al [7]), protocols
based on the decomposition and factorization problems (Stickel [8], Alvares,
Martinez et. al. [9], Shpilrain, Ushakov [10], Romanczuk, Ustimenko [11]),
protocols based on actions by automorphisms (Mahalanobis [12], Rososhek
[13], Markov, Mikhalev et. al. [14]), and a number of other protocols. See
also [15] where the linear decomposition attack is applied to the two main
protocols in [16].
In [4], D. Kahrobaei, H.T. Lam and V. Shpilrain described a public key
exchange protocol based on an extension of a semigroup by automorphisms
(more generally endomorphisms). They proposed a non-commutative semi-
group of matrices over a Galois field as platform.
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In this paper we present a polynomial time deterministic attack that
breakes the two variants of the protocol presented in the papers [3] and [4].
All along the paper we denote by N the set of all positive integers.
2. General key exchange protocol [3], [4].
In this section, we describe a not platform-specific key exchange protocol
proposed in [3] and improved in [4]. We consider the more general version of
this protocol presented in [4]. The corresponding version from [3] has been
analyzed in [5]. Then we will give a cryptanalysis of this protocol under
additional assumption of linearity of the chosen platform.
Let G be a (semi)group and g be a public element in G. Let φ be an
arbitrary public endomorphism of G. Let Gφ = G λ sgp(φ) be the semidirect
product of G and the semigroup sgp(φ) generated by φ. Recall that each
element of Gφ has a unique expression of the form (φ
r, f) where r ∈ N∪{0}
and f ∈ G. Two elements of this form are multiplied as follows: (φr, f) ·
(φs, h) = (φr+s, φs(f)h).
• Alice chooses a private m ∈ N, while Bob chooses a private n ∈ N.
• Alice computes (φ, g)m = (φm, φm−1(g) · · · φ2(g) · φ(g) · g) and sends
only the second component am = φ
m−1(g) · · · φ2(g) · φ(g) · g of this
pair to Bob.
• Bob computes (φ, g)n = (φn, φn−1(g) · · · φ2(g) · φ(g) · g) and sends
only the second component an = φ
n−1(g) · · · φ2(g) · φ(g) · g of this
pair to Alice.
• Alice computes (∗, an)(φ
m, am) = (∗, φ
m(an)am). She does not actu-
ally ”compute” the first component of the pair.
• Bob computes (∗, am)(φ
n, an) = (∗, φ
n(am)an). He does not actually
”compute” the first component of the pair.
• Since φm(an)am = φ
n(am)an = am+n, we should have KAlice =
KBob = am+n, the shared secret key.
This algorithm can be named the noncommutative shift.
Now we show how the shared secret key K = KAlice = KBob can be com-
puted in the case when G is a multiplicative subgroup of a finite dimensional
algebra A over a field F and the endomorphism φ is extended to an endo-
morphism of the underlying vector space V of A. Furthermore, we assume
that the basic field operations in F are efficient, in particular they can be
performed in polynomial time in the size of the elements, e.g., F is finite. In
all the particular protocols considered in this paper the field F satisfies all
these conditions.
Using Gauss elimination we can effectively find a maximal linearly in-
dependent subset L of the set {a0, a1, ..., ak , ...}, where a0 = g and ak =
φk−1(g) · ... · φ(g) · g for k ≥ 1. Indeed, suppose that {a0, ..., ak} is linearly
independent set but ak+1 can be presented as a linear combination of the
form
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ak+1 =
k∑
i=0
λiai, for λi ∈ F.
Suppose by induction that ak+j can be presented as above for every j ≤
t− 1. In particular
ak+t−1 =
k∑
i=0
µiai, for µi ∈ F.
Then
ak+t = φ(ak+t−1) · g =
k∑
i=0
µiφ(ai) · g =
k∑
i=0
µiai+1 = µkλ0a0 +
k−1∑
i=0
(µi + µkλi+1)ai+1.
Thus L = {a0, ..., ak}.
In particular, we can effectively compute
(1) an =
k∑
i=0
ηiai, for ηi ∈ F.
Then
am+n = φ
m(an) · am =
(2)
k∑
i=0
ηiφ
m(ai) · am =
k∑
i=0
ηiφ
i(am) · ai.
Note that all data on the right hand side of (2) is known now. Thus we
get the shared key K = am+n.
In the original version of this cryptosystem [3] G was proposed to be
the semigroup of 3× 3 matrices over the group algebra F7[A5], where A5 is
the alternating group on 5 elements. The authors of [3] used an extension
of the semigroup G by an inner automorphism which is conjugation by a
matrix H ∈ GL3(F7[A5]). Therefore, in this case there is a polynomial time
algorithm to find the shared key K from the public data.
3. Key exchange protocol using matrices over a Galois field
and extensions by special endomorphisms [4].
In this section, we describe the key exchange protocol using matrices over
a Galois field and extensions by special endomorphisms proposed in [4].
Let G be a multiplicative semigroup of the matrix algebra A = M2(F)
of all 2 × 2 matrices over the Galois field F = F2127 . Let ϕ = σH be the
automorphism of G which is a composition of a conjugation by a matrix
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H ∈ GL2(F) with the endomorphism ψ that raises each entry of a given
matrix to the power of 4. The composition is such that ψ is applied first,
followed by conjugation. Note that both these maps naturally extend to
automorphisms of A.
This protocol can be attacked by the linear decomposition attack as it
has been explained in Section 2.
In [4], the situation is considered where the automorphism ϕ is just con-
jugation by a public matrix H ∈ GL2(F). Let g = M ∈ G. By direct
computation one get ak = H
−k(HM)k for every k ∈ N.
This protocol is vulnerable to a linear algebra attack as follows. The
attacker, Eve, is looking for matrices X and Y such that XH = HX,
Y (HM) = (HM)Y , and XY = H−m(HM)m. The first two matrix equa-
tions translate into a system of linear equations in the entries of X and Y
over F. After solving this system and finding invertible solution X and Y ,
Eve can recover the shared secret keyK as follows: XanY = H
−n(XY )(HM)n =
H−nH−m(HM)m(HM)n = H−(m+n)(HM)m+n = am+n = K. The above
algorithm contains a couple of difficulties. Firstly, a solution X might be
invertible. Secondly, all this computations should be done online during
every session.
In contrast to the linear algebra attack, the linear decomposition attack is
very simple. We describe even a more simple version of this attack working
in this specific situation.
Consider the linear space W = SpF(gp(H) · sgp(HM)) generated by all
elements of the form Hk(HM)l where k, l ∈ N∪{0}. One can find effectively
a basis e1, ..., et of W. Obiously, t ≤ 4. Moreover, since every matrix is a root
of a characteristic polynomial of degree 2 one can choose basic elements in
the form ei = H
ki(HM)li , ki, li ∈ {0, 1}, i = 1, ..., t. Now we have public
dates am and an where m,n ∈ N. We can effectively compute
(3) an =
t∑
i=1
ηiei =
t∑
i=1
ηiH
−ki(HM)li , for ηi ∈ F, i = 1, ..., t.
Then
t∑
i=1
ηiH
−kiam(HM)
li =
t∑
i=1
ηiH
−ki(H−m(HM)m)(HM)li =
= H−m(
t∑
i=1
ηiH
−ki(HM)li)(HM)m =
(4) = H−mH−n(HM)n(HM)m = H−(m+n)(HM)m+n = am+n.
Thus one has the shared key K = am+n. Note that the basis e1, ..., et
is constructed one time offline. We don’t need to look in any invertible
solution.
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In [4], the last protocol was changed to avoid the linear algebra attack. As
before H,M ∈ G, where H is invertible and M is assumed to be not invert-
ible. The automorphism ϕ is σH , the inner automorphism corresponding to
H.
• Alice chooses a private m ∈ N, while Bob chooses a private n ∈ N.
Alice also selects a private nonzero matrix R such that R ·(HM) = 0
(the zero matrix), and Bob selects a private nonzero matrix S such
that S ·(HM) = 0. Such matrices R,S exist because the matrix HM
is not invertible.
• Alice computes (ϕ,M)m = (ϕm, ϕm−1(M) · · ·ϕ2(M) · ϕ(M) · M)
where the second component of this pair is am = ϕ
m−1(M) · · ·ϕ2(M)·
ϕ(M) ·M = H−m(HM)m, and sends am +R to Bob.
• Bob computes (ϕ,M)n = (ϕn, ϕn−1(M) · · ·ϕ2(M)·ϕ(M)·M), where
the second component is an = ϕ
n−1(M) · · ·ϕ2(M) · ϕ(M) · M =
H−n(HM)n, and sends an + S to Alice.
• Alice computes (∗, an + S)(ϕ
m, am) = (∗, ϕ
m(an + S)am). She does
not actually ”compute” the first component of the pair. She only
needs the second component of the pair, which isH−(m+n)(HM)m+n+
(H−mSHm) · (H−m(HM)m). Since S · (HM) = 0, so Alice gets
KAlice = am+n.
• Bob computes (∗, am+R)(ϕ
n, an) = (∗, ϕ
n(am+R)an). He does not
actually ”compute” the first component of the pair. Similarly, he
gets KBob = am+n.
• Alice and Bob have the shared secret key K = KAlice = KBob =
am+n.
It is shown in [4] that the linear algebra attack as above does not work
against this protocol. Unfortunately, this protocol is vulnerable against the
linear decomposition attack as follows.
Consider the linear spaceW generated by all elements of the formH−k(HM)k
where k = 1, 2, .... Note that am, an ∈ W. Let U be the annihilator space of
HM consisting of all matrices A ∈ A such that A · (HM) = 0. Note that
R,S ∈ U. Let Z =W +U. One can find effectively a basis e1, ..., el, f1, ..., ft
of Z, where ei ∈ W, i = 1, ..., l; fj ∈ U, j = 1, ..., t. Let ei = H
−ki(HM)ki ,
where ki ∈ N, i = 1, ..., l.
Now we have public dates am + R and an + S where m,n ∈ N, and we
know that R,S ∈ U. We can effectively compute
(5) an + S =
l∑
i=1
ηiei +
t∑
j=1
νjfj =
l∑
i=1
ηi(H
−ki(HM)ki + S1,
where ηi, νj ∈ F for i = 1, ..., l and j = 1, ..., t, and S1 ∈ U. It is possible
that S1 6= S.
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Then
l∑
i=1
ηiH
−ki(H−m(HM)m +R)(HA)ki =
= H−m(
l∑
i=1
ηiH
−ki(HA)ki)(HM)m =
(6) H−m(H−n(HM)n − S1)(HM)
m = H−(m+n)(HM)m+n = am+n.
Thus one has the shared secret key K = am+n. Note: 1) the basis
e1, ..., el, f1, ..., ft is constructed one time offline, 2) we don’t need to look in
invertible solution of considered sets of linear equations along the algorithm
works. We apply the usual Gauss elimination process to find unique solution
every time when we solve sets of linear equations in the algorithm. Hence,
this algorithm is deterministic. Moreover, in the case where the platform is
such or similar as proposed in [4] the algorithm is practical. Note: we don’t
compute m and/or n to recover K.
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